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Bargaining and the Division of Value
in Corporate Reorganization
Lucian Ayre Bebchuk
Harvard Law School and the National Bureau of Economic Research
Howard F. Chang
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

1. Introduction
Reorganization is one of the two alternatives open to an insolvent corporation
under the Bankruptcy Code. A bankrupt corporation may file either for liquidation under Chapter 7 or for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Upon a filing for liquidation, a court immediately appoints a
trustee to sell the firm's assets, either piecemeal or as a going concern, to
outside buyers. The proceeds from this sale are divided among those who
have rights against the corporation, with the division made according to the
ranking of these rights by legal priority.
The firm may go instead into Chapter 11 , under which the firm can be
"reorganized." In reorganization there is no sale to third parties. Rather, there
is a "hypothetical sale" of the firm to the existing "participants" -all those
who hold claims or rights against the insolvent company. These participants
surrender their claims and rights in exchange for claims and rights against the
new corporation. For example, a bankrupt company may emerge from reorganization with all its debt canceled and with the former debtholders holding some or all of the equity of the reorganized company.
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and M.I.T. for helpful comments and the John M. Olin Foundation for financial support. Lucian
Bebchuk's work has been supported also by the National Science Foundation.

© 1992 by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. ISSN 8756-6222

254

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V8 N2

If the court supervising a reorganization could observe the value of the
reorganized firm, it would allocate that value among the participants according to the legal priority of their claims. For example, consider a company that
has equityholders and that owes debtholders $200, and suppose that the court
observes that the value of the reorganized company will be $150; in this case,
the court would order that all of the reorganized company's securities be given
to the debtholders, and none be given to the equityholders. Below we will use
the term "contractual right" to mean that which a class would receive if the
bankruptcy court could observe the firm's value and distributed it among the
classes according to the initial contracts, that is, strictly in the order of the legal
priority of their claims.
Because a court cannot determine accurately an objective figure for this
value, however, the law leaves the division of the reorganized company's
value to a process of bargaining among the classes of participants. Under the
Bankruptcy Code, each class of equityholders and debtholders whose interests
are impaired must vote to approve a reorganization plan, which would include
a division of value. The approval by a class requires a certain majority of the
class members to vote in favor of the plan. As is generally believed by
participants in reorganization and as will be shown in this article, the outcome
of this bargaining process often diverges from the contractual rights of the
classes.
In Section 2 of this article, we develop a sequential bargaining model of the
negotiations in corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11. We identify the
expected outcome of the bargaining process and examine the effects of the legal
rules that shape the bargaining. We determine how much value each class will
receive and what factors give each class an advantage or a disadvantage in the
bargaining process. We also compare the share of the reorganized firm's value
that each class obtains under the existing legal regime with the contractual
right of that class. 1
The critical features of the situation that we model are as follows. Once an
insolvent company files for reorganization under Chapter 11, an "automatic
stay" prevents debtholders from seizing the company's assets as long as the
company is in Chapter 11. If there is no agreement on a reorganization plan,
eventually the supervising court would convert the bankruptcy proceedings to
a Chapter 7 sale. For the debtholders to obtain any value before such a

1. In spite of the growing interest by economists in corporate reorganization, little work has
been done thus far to model bargaining under Chapter 11. Brown analyzed this bargaining, but
his model does not include certain important features of the process that we seek to incorporate.
First, whereas time plays no role in Brown's model, we analyze the implications of the critical
fact that upon filing for Chapter 11 a company may be kept in Chapter 11 , protected from
creditors, for some time. As our model shows, the bargaining is shaped by the possibility of such
a delay, because the value available for division may well change over time as a result of the
realization of uncertainty and the company's incurring financial distress costs. Moreover, whereas
in Brown's model no class can make many offers, we develop a sequential bargaining model in
which each class can make many offers during the Chapter 11 period.
In surveying past work, note should be made of the related literature about debt renegotiation
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conversion, however, the two classes, equityholders and debtholders, must
agree on a division of value (i.e., on a reorganization plan).
If the parties do not agree immediately, and the company remains in Chapter 11 for some time, then the value available for division may well change,
for two reasons. First, the company would incur some "financial distress
costs," to be discussed later, which would reduce its value. Second, uncertainty will be realized: random shocks may increase or decrease the firm's
value. Furthermore, if the two classes ultimately do not reach agreement, and
the assets are sold under Chapter 7, such a sale might sometimes involve a
loss of value. These potential consequences of the parties' failure to reach
agreement are important elements of our model, because they provide the
background against which the parties would decide which offers to make or
accept.
Empirical studies of corporate reorganization (e.g., Eberhart, Moore, and
Roenfeldt; Weiss; Franks and Torous) confirm that Chapter 11 often enables
equityholders to obtain a share of the value of the reorganized company even
when that value is less than sufficient to cover debtholders' claims. The
debtholders often agree to plans giving the equityholders a share of this value
even when the debtholders are not paid in full. Our model identifies and
analyzes three sources of the equityholders' ability to obtain value and the
parameters that determine how much value they will obtain.
As will be shown, Chapter 11 gives equityholders the ability to obtain
value, even though the company is insolvent. The fact that their consent is
necessary for a division of value enables equityholders to obtain value for
three reasons. The first two reasons arise from the ability of the equityholders
to delay the adoption of a reorganization plan from the beginning of the
Chapter 11 period to a later date. First, if equityholders delay agreement,
there may be a favorable resolution of uncertainty that would cause the value
of the firm to exceed the value of its debt. Thus, the equityholders have an
"option value," and to forgo it they must be compensated by the agreed
distribution of value. Second, if the equityholders withhold their consent and
thereby delay agreement, the company will be expected to incur "financial
distress costs" that will erode the value that debtholders can expect to receive.
Thus, the equityholders' consent to a division of value can save the firm
"financial distress costs," and therefore they can obtain a share of these
(see, e.g., Bergman and Callen; Hart and Moore, 1989; Giammarino; and Webb). (Of these
articles, the closest to ours in modeling approach is that of Bergman and Callen, who also use a
sequential bargaining model, though not one in which the firm value may fluctuate during the
bargaining period as a result of the realization of uncertainty.) Debt renegotiation prior to formal
bankruptcy proceedings, however, differs from that within such proceedings. Our focus, of
course, is on bargaining within Chapter 11 with special emphasis on how the legal rules of
Chapter 11 shape this process.
Finally, after developing our model, we learned about an independent effort to develop a
sequential bargaining model of Chapter 11 by Baird and Picker. While they share our approach,
their model differs substantially from ours; in particular, in their model the company's value is
assumed not to change during the Chapter 11 period.
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savings. The fraction of these savings that they obtain depends upon the rules
that govern the Chapter 11 bargaining. In particular, the equityholders in
effect have an exclusive power to propose reorganization plans for a period of
time, which increases the fraction of the savings of "financial distress costs"
that the equityholders can capture.
The third reason that the equityholders can obtain value (even when the
value of the reorganized firm is insufficient to pay the debt in full) arises when
the parties expect a Chapter 7 sale to entail a loss of value. In this case, the
equityholders' consent to a division of value is necessary to avoid this loss.
Therefore, they can obtain a fraction of the value gained by avoiding a Chapter 7 sale.
The model in Section 2 reveals how much each of the elements descrioed
above contributes to the value that equityholders will receive. Comparative
statics analysis is also presented in Section 2. In particular, the amount that
equityholders will receive tends to increase with (i) the volatility of the value
of the company's assets, (ii) the extent to which reorganization imposes
"financial distress costs," (iii) the length of the reorganization period, (iv) the
length of the period during which the equityholders have the exclusive right to
make offers, (v) the extent to which liquidation imposes a loss in value, and
(vi) the extent to which the value of the company's assets covers the company's debts. As will be discussed, these results provide several testable
implications of the model.
Finally, concluding remarks on some issues for further research are offered
in Section 3. While we focus on the positive analysis of the bargaining process
under Chapter 11, this analysis is a prerequisite for a normative analysis of the
efficiency costs of Chapter 11. Accordingly, in Section 3, we discuss the
implications of the model for the welfare effects of Chapter 11.

2. The Model
2.1 Framework of Analysis

We consider a company with one class of equity and one class of debt that files
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Let V be the value of the company's assets
at the time of filing. 2 Upon filing for bankruptcy, the company owes an
amount D, where D > V. Thus, the value of the assets is insufficient to cover
the debt in full. (In Section 2. 7, we discuss how the model can be extended to
the case in which D :::; V.)
The firm is to emerge from the reorganization with an all-equity structure or
some other capital structure that avoids the "financial distress costs" to be
described below. Under Chapter 11 , the corporate reorganization process ends
when the various classes of investors accept a plan including a division of
value. If the parties fail to agree on a reorganization plan, the supervising
court would eventually convert the bankruptcy proceedings to a Chapter 7
liquidation (usually following a petition by creditors). For concreteness, we
2. More specifically, Vis the value that the company would have if its capital structure were
such that the firm is not expected to incur the "financial distress costs" to be described below.
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assume that if the parties fail to reach an agreement within a time period T, the
company will be liquidated. The firm remains in Chapter 11 reorganization
until time t = T unless the parties reach agreement before then. 3
For an agreement on the distribution of value, one class must propose a
reorganization plan, and then both classes must accept it. The Bankruptcy
Code and the Bankruptcy Rules, however, include certain notice and hearing
requirements that introduce a delay of at least 25 days between offer and
response. 4 In this respect, bargaining in the reorganization context differs
from that in other contexts, in which each round of bargaining-an offer and
the response to it-can take a very short period of time.
Let Lit be the length of one round of bargaining, that is, the time required
until a proposed reorganization plan can be accepted or rejected under Chapter
11. Let n = T/Ltt (assumed for simplicity to be an integer greater than 1) be
the number of bargaining rounds during the reorganization period. Let Vi
denote the value of the company if the parties adopt a reorganization plan at
the end of round i, where i = 1, ... ,n. 5
The firm's value Vi evolves over time. That is, if the parties approve a
reorganization plan in any round after round 1, the value divided might differ
from V1 . Specifically, if delay were to occur, the value may change for the
following two reasons. One reason is that the firm will bear "financial distress
costs" -efficiency costs that the firm must incur while it is in Chapter 11 and
that it would not incur if it had a new capital structure. There are several
sources of financial distress costs. First, Chapter 11 bankruptcy involves
significant administrative costs; indeed, the fees paid to lawyers, accountants,
various professional consultants, and expert witnesses in a Chapter 11 reorganization of a publicly traded company are often on the order of tens of
3. Our assumption that the firm cannot emerge from Chapter II before t = T without an
agreement is a simplification of the legal rules. In reality, the equityholders can impose a plan on
the debtholders so long as the debtholders are paid in full. The equityholders would choose to exit
Chapter II by paying D in full if during the bargaining the value of the firm were to rise
sufficiently above D, for much the same reasons (to be discussed below in Section 2. 7) that they
would rather avoid Chapter II if V were sufficiently greater than D.
We adopt our simplifying assumption for convenience; a more complex model could include
this option for the equityholders to exit Chapter II but would not yield results significantly
different from ours. In particular, this extension of our model would not change the direction of
our comparative statics results. The addition of such an "exit option" would only increase the
share of the firm obtained by the equityholders. This option can only strengthen the equityholders'
bargaining power, because they would exercise this option only if it would improve their payoffs.
4. In particular, after the filing of a Chapter II case, acceptance for any particular plan may
not be solicited until after a hearing by the supervising court held on 25-days notice to the parties
in interest.
5. Once the firm is reorganized and its shares are distributed, its new shareholders would
obviously have the power to select the company's management. We do not analyze the possibility
that either the equityholders or the debtholders have any special management skills necessary for
running the company. Ignoring this possibility appears quite appropriate for publicly traded firms,
which are often run by professional managers. Baird and Picker, who focus on the reorganization
of closely held firms with a small group of shareholders-managers, consider the interesting
implications of the presence of shareholders-managers with some special management skills.
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millions of dollars. In one recent reorganization of a major corporation, the
bankruptcy expenses of the company and of the creditor committees came to
$3.5 million per month (see Cutler and Summers:167). Second, potential
business partners may be reluctant to deal with the company or may demand
especially favorable terms, for those doing business with a firm in financial
distress may incur greater information costs, monitoring costs, enforcement
costs, and collection costs. Third, financial distress might lead to inefficient
management decisions, especially with respect to the choice of projects and
investments (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling; Myers; Hart and Moore, 1990).
For an empirical investigation of such financial distress costs, see Lang and
Stulz. We assume that as a result of these financial distress costs, the company
loses an amount of its value continuously over time at the rate of a per period
L1t-that is, per round of bargaining-as long as the company is in Chapter
11.6
The second reason for Vi to change over time is that uncertainty will be
realized. Random shocks may increase or decrease the value of the company's
assets. We assume that during each round of bargaining, unpredictable events
would cause this value to be either higher or lower than expected by the
amount 8, and that either state of the world occurs with equal probability. The
parameter 8, then, represents the volatility of the firm's value. For concreteness, we assume that at the beginning of each round, information is
revealed that causes the value of the firm to either rise or fall instantaneously
by the amount ().
Let the value realized after revelation of information at the start of round 1
be V and let Vi be the value at the end of round i. Thus, V1 = V- a, and Vi =
Vi-I + Oi, fori= 2, ... ,n, Where Oi = -a-() With probability!, and Oi =
-a + 8 with probability!. The value of oi is realized at the start of round i,
before the ith offer is made. We assume 0 < a < 8, so that the company's
value will increase with probability ! despite the financial distress costs. We
also assume that (n - 1)(a + 8) < V 1 , so that the company's value cannot
disappear completely during the reorganization period. 7
6. Note that the financial distress costs in our model result from the firm's mere presence in
Chapter 11 and would be eliminated only if a reorganization agreement were reached (creating a
sound financial structure). We abstract from the possibility that the shareholders might be able to
cause some deterioration beyond the one resulting from the firm's being in Chapter 11 and,
seeking to get concessions from the debtholders, might threaten to do so. Bergman and Callen
present an interesting model of threats by shareholders of solvent firms to deliberately cause some
deterioration in the situation of the firm. As they discuss, a critical question with respect to such
threats is that of credibility. The credibility issue does not arise with respect to the financial
distress costs in our model, because these costs would be incurred, whether or not the shareholders wish to have them, as long as the firm is in Chapter 11.
7. For simplicity, we can assume that the interest rate is zero, so that there is no discounting.
Alternatively, we can allow for a positive interest rate and interpret all variables representing
values-such as V, V1o and D-as present discounted values. Under this interpretation, we
would assume that all equityholders and debtholders share a common discount rate, which would
also equal the interest rate on the debt. V would denote the present discounted value of the future
stream of earnings that the assets would produce if the firm were reorganized at time t = 0.
Similarly, V; would be the corresponding value (discounted to time t = 0) if the firm were
reorganized at the end of round i.
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We also assume the following timing of events. In each round, once the
uncertainty is realized, one party proposes a reorganization plan, that is, a
division of the value that will exist at the end of the round. At the end of the
round, after the delay created by the rules governing the solicitation of acceptances, the value has deteriorated by the amount a. At this point, the two
classes decide whether to accept or reject the plan. The class proposing the
plan, naturally, votes to accept the proposal. If the other class also accepts the
proposal, the plan is confirmed, and the firm immediately emerges from
Chapter 11 with its· value divided according to the plan. If the other class
instead rejects the proposal, then the parties go to the next round of
bargaining. 8
As in any sequential bargaining model, it is necessary to specify a procedure that determines which party makes the offer in each round. In the case
of Chapter 11 bargaining, the Bankruptcy Code determines some of this
bargaining protocol. The Bankruptcy Code establishes a period during which
only the debtor (i.e., the incumbent management) has the right to propose
reorganization plans. The incumbent management generally will have at least
six months in which to produce a reorganization plan and obtain the necessary
acceptances, and courts may grant extensions of this period (see Trost: 1325).
Although the insolvent corporation and its management have fiduciary duties
to creditors as well as shareholders, most observers expect management to
favor the interests of shareholders. As Normandin (1989:56-8) notes, management not only is elected by the shareholders but also often holds a substantial interest in the corporation's stock. Consistent with this observation, this
article assumes that with respect to proposals to divide the value of the
reorganized firm between equityholders and debtholders, management acts on
behalf of the equityholders. 9
To represent the period during which the management has the exclusive
8. The above description of the sequence of events assumes implicitly that each class of
claimants acts as a single agent. We assume that the set of equityholders and the set of debtholders
are mutually exclusive. Given our assumptions, there is no conflict of interest among the class
members, and they will all agree on whether a plan should be accepted or rejected.
Given the homogeneity of each class in the model, there is no need to introduce the possibility
that exists under section 1129 (a) (7) of the Bankruptcy Code for a veto by an individual member.
Under that provision, dissenting members can veto a plan that fails the "best interests of the
creditors" test-that is, a plan that provides them with less than the liquidation value of their
claims-even if the required majority of the class votes to accept the plan. When there are
differences in preferences or in information among class members, then individual members may
wish sometimes to exercise such a veto. But if there are no such differences among class
members, as we assume, then no member would wish to veto a plan that other members of the
class voted to approve.
9. It is not our assumption that management acts in the equityholders' interests in all respects.
The interests of the equityholders and of management may well diverge with respect to certain
investment decisions. With respect to management's proposals to divide the value of the reorganized firm between equityholders and debtholders, however, we believe it reasonable to
assume that management will prefer the interests of equityholders.
The assumptions that the managers initially have exclusive control of the bargaining agenda,
and that they use this control to the advantage of the equityholders, do not matter much for our
results. As will be noted, one can easily modify our model to accommodate the case in which
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right to propose plans, we assume that the equityholders make at least the first
offer and possibly the first several offers. That is, they have the exclusive right
to make offers for the first e rounds, where e is an integer such that 0 < e < n.
Over the remaining n - e rounds, both classes may make offers. (This
possibility is indeed contemplated by Chapter 11 , and firms often remain in
Chapter 11 even after the exclusive period runs out.) To capture the possibility
of either party making the offer in any given round, we assume that at the
beginning of each of these n - e rounds, the identity of the class making the
offer is determined randomly, with the probability of each equal to !. 10
If the parties were to fail to reach agreement in round n, we assume that the
court would convert the proceedings to a Chapter 7 liquidation. In that event,
the assets of the company would be sold. Let the random variable L denote the
value obtained through such a sale, which would then be divided according to
the legal priority of the parties' claims. That is, equityholders get an amount
VEL= max(O, L- D), and debtholders get the complementary share, VDL =
L - max(O, L - D) = min(L, D). At this point, we will assume that L = Vn;
that is, we assume that the sale procedure occurs immediately and does not
involve any loss of value. In Section 2.5, however, we will drop the assumption that L = Vn and extend the analysis to cover the case in which L < Vn.
We also assume that all parties are risk neutral. Thus, each class seeks to
maximize the expected value of its share. Finally, we assume that the structure
of the bargaining game described above-including the values of the parameters V 1 , D, L, a, 8, T, e, and n-is common knowledge to the participants.
2.2 The Division of Value

Under the assumption of common knowledge, the parties will reach an agreement at the end of round 1. As in the sequential bargaining game analyzed by
Rubinstein, to obtain agreement, the party making the proposal in round i
would offer the other at least what the other could obtain in expected value in
round i + 1, where i = 1, ... ,n - 1. Each party would offer just this amount to
the other in order to maximize its own share. It cannot expect to do better by
asking for any larger amount, which would delay agreement and allow the
other party to make the next offer.
The party whose tum it would be in round i, denoted by X, offers to take the
amount VX; of the total value V;. By the argument above,
(1)

there is no initial agenda control or the case in which the control is not exercised in the interest of
equityholders, and these modifications do not have important effects on our conclusions. See
Section 2.8 and note 14, respectively.
10. Having each party make the offer with probability ! in each round is one of the two
conventional alternatives in modeling a situation in which two parties can make offers. The
second alternative is to assume that the two parties alternate in making offers. In a model with a
finite number of rounds (such as ours), however, the first alternative ensures that the division of
value is not sensitive to whether the number of rounds, n, is even or odd. We prefer the first
method because it renders it unnecessary to make such arbitrary assumptions regarding n.
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where VXi + 1 denotes the amount X would obtain under the plan proposed in
the next round, and Ei denotes the expected value conditional on information
available in round i, that is, conditional on the realized value of Vi. By our
assumptions about 0, we also know that the expected "efficiency gain" from
an agreement in round i rather than round i + 1 is
(2)

Using (2) to substitute into (1),
(3)

Thus, when the party making the offer, X, holds the other to its expected
payoff next round, X thereby takes for itself the expected "efficiency gain," a,
plus its own expected payoff next round.
Under liquidation at the end of round n, equityholders would receive VEv
and debtholders would receive VDv where VEL + VDL = L = Vn. In round
n, the party making the offer cannot gain by proposing any other division,
because the other party will reject any proposal offering it a smaller share.
Therefore, VEn = VEL and VDn = VDL. The party making the nth offer
cannot capture any "efficiency gain" from avoiding financial distress costs,
because we have assumed here that liquidation occurs costlessly and immediately upon rejection of the offer.
We solve for the unique subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction. In round n - 1, the party making the offer would hold the other to its
expected round n payoff and take for itself the expected "efficiency gain"
(from agreement in round n- 1 rather than round n), a, plus its own expected
round n payoff. Similarly, in round n - 2, the offering party would hold the
other party to its expected round n - 1 payoff (which is !a plus its expected
round n payoff, if it would make the offer in round n - 1 with probability!)
and take the balance. That balance amounts to the expected "efficiency gain"
(from agreement in round n - 2 rather than round n - 1), a, plus its own
expected round n- 1 payoff. Its expected round n - 1 payoff, in tum, is also
!a plus its expected round n payoff, if it would make the offer in round n - 1
with probability ! . 11
In sum, in each round, each party receives its expected round n payoff plus
a times the number of offers it would expect to make from the current round to
round n - 1. In round 1, therefore, the equityholders receive their expected
round n payoff plus a times the number of offers they would expect to make
before round n. Because each party would expect to make !(n - 1 - e) offers

11 . All expectations are taken conditional on information available at the time of the current
offer, that is, in round n - 2. Recall that by the law of iterated expectations, the expectation of an
expectation conditional on more information is simply the unconditional expectation. In the
example above,
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from round e + 1 to round n - 1 , and the equityholders in addition would
make all e offers from round 1 to round e, the equityholders receive

(4)
and the debtholders receive
(5)

at the end of round 1. Moreover, because we assume liquidation is costless,
(4) equals
VE 1 = !a(e

+n-

1)

+ E 1 [max(O,Vn

(6)

-D)],

and (5) equals
VD 1 = !a(n - 1 - e)

+ E 1 [min(D, Vn)].

(7)

The second term in (6) is the expected value of what equityholders would
receive if there is no agreement through round n and there is instead liquidation. In the alternative, we may express this expected value as
(8)

where Pr(Vn > D) is the probability of Vn > D. We can also express this
expected value as a function of our basic parameters, making use of the
particular probability distribution of vn·

Lemma 1. The expected values of what the parties would receive from a
costless liquidation if they failed to reach agreement by time t = T are as
follows:
n-1

k

~=O
Edmax(O,Vn -D)] = L.J

(

_21 )

n-1

x max[O,V 1

(n -k

1 )

D - (a

-

+

8)(n - 1)

+

28k]

(9)

for the equityholders, and
1

.

E 1 [mm(D, Vn)] =

~
L.J

(

21 ) n-1 (

n - 1 )
k

k=O

X

for the debtholders.

min[D, V1

-

(a

+

8)(n - 1)

+

28k]

(10)
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o

Proof Each round is a Bernoulli trial in which may take on one of two
values with equal probability, so n - 1 such trials from round 2 to round n
lead to 2n- 1 equally likely sequences of oi· Let k represent the number of
times takes on the high value, 8 - a, from the end of round 1 to the end of
round n, so that n - 1 - k is the number of times it takes on the low value,
-8 - a. The number of distinct sequences with the same k is given by the
binomial coefficient. Thus, k is a random variable, taking values from 0 ton
- 1, that follows the binomial distribution:

o

21 ) n-1 (

b(k,n - 1) = (

n - 1)
k

( 1)

2

(n -

n-1

1)!

k!(n - 1 - k)!

(11)

Given any set of values for the parameters known in round 1, including V1 ,
there are n possible values for V n• because there are n possible values for k:
VJk) = V 1
= V1

-

-

a(n - 1) + 8k - 8(n - 1 - k)
+ 8)(n - 1) + 28k.

(12)

(a

Therefore, the probability of each Vn(k) is given by the binomial formula in
•
(11). Together (11) and (12) yield the above lemma.
Using (9) and (10) to substitute into (6) and (7), respectively, we can
conclude with the following proposition.

Proposition 1. The two classes of claimants will adopt a reorganization
plan in round 1, with the equityholders obtaining

VE 1 =

1

2 a(e +

n -

1)

+

n~l

(

LJ

1

2

)n-1 ( n -k

1 )

k=O

x max[O,V 1

D - (a + 8)(n - 1) + 28k],

-

(13)

and the debtholders obtaining the complementary share:
1

VD 1 =

.!.a(n -

1 - e)

+

2

X

~ ( .!. )n-I ( n k=O

min[D, V 1

-

(a

+

8)(n - 1)

1

)

k

2

+

28k],

(14)

2.3 The Sources of the Equityholders' Power

Although debtholders' claims exceed the value of the firm in round 1, equityholders receive a round-1 share greater than 0. We can isolate two distinct
sources of the equityholders' power to obtain more than its contractual right.
The equityholders' share, VE 1 as expressed in (13), is composed of two terms.
Each term corresponds to a different reason for equityholders to get a positive
share even though D > V1 • (In Section 2.5, when we introduce the possibility
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that conversion to Chapter 7 liquidation may cause the firm to lose value,
there will be a third source of the equityholders' power to obtain value.)
2.3.1 The Financial Distress Costs Created by Delay. The total "efficiency
gains" from reaching agreement in round 1 rather than leaving the firm in
Chapter 11 for n rounds is a(n - 1), because such agreement thereby avoids
the deterioration in firm value that would occur during the next n - 1 rounds.
Because the consent of the equityholders is necessary to avoid incurring these
financial distress costs, the equityholders can obtain part of these savings in
exchange for that consent. The first term in (13) is the equityholders' share of
these savings and represents the gain to equityholders from the presence of
financial distress costs. If we let a go to 0 in the limit, then the savings from
avoiding delay also go to 0, and the equityholders would receive only the
second term, E 1 [VEn].
The first term in (13), !a(e + n - 1), may be expressed as the sum of two
elements, as in (4). First, during the first e rounds, when the equityholders
have the exclusive power to make offers, they expect to capture all the savings
from agreement in round 1 rather than in round e + 1. This surplus amounts to
ae. Second, during the last n- e rounds, when both the equityholders and the
debtholders can make offers, each class expects to capture half of the savings
from agreement in round e + 1 rather than in round n. Therefore, the equityholders can obtain half of this surplus, that is, !a(n - 1 - e), in round 1.
2.3.2 The "Option Value" Created by Delay. The second term in (13) represents the gain to equityholders from the possibility of Vn greater than D. The
equityholders could deny their consent to any plan and delay a division of
value until round n. Given the volatility of Vi, there is some chance that at the
end of round n, Vn will exceed D. Although the expected value of Vn is less
than V1 , the actual value of Vn might exceed V1 and even D. The Chapter 11
process, by giving the equityholders the ability to insist on delay, gives
equityholders the option to receive the difference Vn - D. To give up this
option, equityholders must get compensation in return.
Specifically, equityholders receive the expected value of VEn, that is, the
full value of the equityholders' "option." This "option value" is positive if
and only if Pr(Vn >D) > 0. Furthermore, Pr(Vn >D) > 0 if and only if Vn >
D when all uncertainty is resolved favorably, that is, 6 = (} - a in each round,
so that k = n - 1 in (12). Therefore, the following two conditions are
equivalent:
Pr(Vn > D) > 0

~

(n -

1)((} - a) > D - V1 .

(15)

2.4 Comparative Statics

The equityholders' share of V1 consists of two terms that depend on the
following parameters: (i) the initial undercoverage of debt, D - V 1 ; (ii) the
volatility of the firm's value from period to period, (}; (iii) the financial
distress costs per unit of time Lit, a; (iv) the length of the reorganization

I
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period measured in rounds of bargaining, n; and (v) the length of the period
during which the equityholders control the agenda, also measured in rounds of
bargaining, e. We will now examine how each of these parameters affects the
equityholders' share, VE 1 •
2.4.1 The Initial Undercoverage of Debt. By the initial undercoverage of
debt, we mean the extent to which the debt exceeds the value of the firm's
assets at the end of round 1, D - V 1 •

Proposition 2. The share of V 1 obtained by equityholders, VE 1 , is nonincreasing in D - V 1 (and thus in D). Furthermore, if there is a positive
probability that V n will exceed D, then VE 1 is decreasing in D - V 1 (and thus
in D).I 2
Remark. The intuition underlying Proposition 2 is as follows. A rise in D V 1 affects only the second term in (13). In particular, it shifts down the entire
probability distribution of Vn - D in the expression for the equityholders'
"option value" in (13). That "option value" arises from the possibility of V;
rising from V 1 to above D due to positive shocks. Because a higher D - V1
makes this event less likely, it reduces this "option value." Thus, as shown in
the proof, a rise in D - V 1 cannot make equityholders better off, and if D V 1 is small enough to imply Pr(Vn >D)> 0, then such a rise must cause their
"option value" (and their share of V1) to decrease.
Proof See the Appendix.
2.4.2 The Volatility of Firm Value. The volatility of the firm's value over time,
represented bye, depends upon the nature of the firm's business and thus may
vary greatly from firm to firm.

Proposition 3. The share of V 1 obtained by equityholders, VE 1 , is nondecreasing in 8. Furthermore, if there is a positive probability that Vn will
exceed or equal D, then VE 1 is increasing in (). 13
Remark. The intuition underlying Proposition 3 is as follows. The volatility
of the firm's value affects only the second term in (13). As shown in the proof,
the greater that volatility, (), the greater the likelihood that Vn will exceed D,
and the greater will be the equityholders' "option value." Thus, a rise in ()
must leave equityholders at least as well off as before, and if() is large enough

12. Specifically, if D - V1 < (n- 1)(0 - a), then Pr(Vn >D)> 0, and increasing D - V1
will cause V£ 1 to decrease. If D - V 1 ::::: (n - 1)(0 - a), then Pr(Vn >D) = 0, and further
increasing D - V 1 will have no effect on VE 1 •
13. Specifically, if 0 < a + (D - V1)/(n - 1), then Pr(Vn :::::D) = 0, and increasing 0 will
have no effect on V£1. If 0::::: a+ (D- V 1)/(n- 1), then Pr(Vn::::: D)> 0, and increasing 0 will
cause VE 1 to increase.
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to imply Pr(Vn 2: D) > 0, then their "option value" (and their share of V1 )
must increase in 8.
Proof. See the Appendix.

2.4.3 The Financial Distress Costs. The financial distress costs per unit of
time that the firm remains in Chapter 11, a, are likely to vary greatly among
firms. For example, a company that owns a number of buildings leased under
long-term leases would incur small financial distress costs (because few transactions would have to take place during the Chapter 11 period) relative to a
company that deals frequently with many business partners and makes frequent investment decisions.
Proposition 4. The share of V 1 obtained by equityholders, VE 1 , is increasing in a.
Remark. The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is as follows. The size of
the financial distress costs, a, will affect both terms in (13). Thus, a rise in a
has two effects. On the one hand, it increases the financial distress costs that
can be saved if the equityholders consent to a plan, thus improving their
bargaining position. On the other hand, it decreases their "option value"
because it makes it less likely that Vi can climb beyond D. If a increases to the
point that Pr(Vn >D) = 0, then the equityholders' share is affected by a only
through the first effect and therefore a rise in a makes equityholders unambiguously better off. Furthermore, as shown in the proof, the positive effect is
always greater than the negative effect, because the financial distress costs are
more likely to fall on the debtholders than on the equityholders. Therefore,
the equityholders' share increases in a.
Proof. See the Appendix.

2.4.4 The Length of the Reorganization Period. The length of the reorganization period, represented in our model by T (or equivalently by the number of
rounds n), depends on how long the bankruptcy court will wait, in the face of
failure to work out a reorganization plan, before converting from Chapter 11
to Chapter 7. Let us consider increases in T by multiples of L1 t, which would
cause n to rise by an integer, so as to maintain the structure of the model,
which assumes that n is an integer.
Proposition 5. The share of V 1 obtained by equityholders, VE 1 , is increasing in n.
Remark. The intuition underlying Proposition 5 is as follows. A rise in T
affects both terms in (13) through n. First, it raises the total financial distress
costs that the firm would incur if equityholders never gave their consent to a
plan. This effect strengthens their bargaining power. Second, once Pr(Vn >D)

Bargaining in Corporate Reorganization

267

> 0, an increase inn also would have an effect on their "option value." As
shown in the proof, some increases will cause an upward change in the
"option value" (because high values for vn become more likely) whereas
others will cause a downward change (because the expected value of Vn falls).
We show in the proof, however, that even in the case of a downward change,
the overall effect on the equityholders' share is positive. In those cases in
which a rise inn causes the equityholders' "option value" to fall, the positive
effect upon the equityholders' share of the "efficiency gains" would be greater
than the absolute value of the negative effect, because the costs of delay
would be more likely to fall on the debtholders than on the equityholders.
Proof. See the Appendix.

2.4.5 The Initial Agenda Control. As already noted, the equityholders have
control over the agenda for the first six months of bargaining, and the courts
often extend this period. Our model captures this feature of Chapter 11 by
assuming that all offers in the first e rounds, 0 < e < n, must be made by the
equityholders. 14 The size of e depends on the courts' willingness to extend the
initial six-month period.
Proposition 6. The share of V1 obtained by the equityholders, VE 1 , is increasing in e. Specifically, any unit increase in e causes VE 1 to increase by la.
Remark. The intuition underlying Proposition 6 is as follows. Control over
the reorganization agenda is valuable. During each round in which the equityholders have this control, they would capture all of the financial distress costs,
a. In any round in which both sides can make offers, however, the equityholders expect to capture only la. The incremental gain to the equityholders
from any unit increase in e is therefore la. The greater are the financial
distress costs, the greater is the value of this unit increase (the derivative of
the equityholders' gain with respect to a is i). Furthermore, a higher e implies
that a rise in a benefits equityholders even more than it would otherwise,
because only they gain bargaining power from the deterioration of firm value
from round 1 to round e + 1. The derivative of the "efficiency gains"
component in (13) with respect to a is i(e + n - 1), and each unit increase in
e raises this derivative by l.
Proof. The proof is clear from the above remark.
14. In reality, the incumbent management controls the agenda during this initial period, but we
have assumed that managers act on behalf of the equityholders. One could easily adjust the model
to suit alternative assumptions. For example, consider a case in which the debt is held by a bank
which the managers expect to hold most of the stock of the company after reorganization. In this
case, one might assume that the management, in making offers during the period in which it
controls the agenda, would serve the interests of the debtholders. As a result, the debtholders
rather than the equityholders would capture all the surplus ae that is created by avoiding the
financial distress costs that would be incurred during the initial period.
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2.5 Loss from Chapter 7 Liquidation

Until now we have assumed that a sale of the finn's assets under Chapter 7
would not impose any efficiency loss. That is, we assumed that after n rounds
a Chapter 7 sale would produce a value of L = Vn. This assumption would be
reasonable if one adopted the view of Baird (1986) and Jackson (1986:
chap. 9). According to that view, there is no reason to expect that a sale under
Chapter 7, properly administered, would produce a value significantly below
the finn's going-concern value. If the finn has greater value as a going
concern, then the assets would be sold as a going concern.
This view of Chapter 7, however, is by no means universally accepted.
Many scholars and players in corporate insolvency believe, correctly or incorrectly, that Chapter 7 would involve some efficiency loss-that is, it might not
bring in the full value Vn. For this reason, we now introduce the possibility
that a Chapter 7 sale at t = T would produce a value L < Vn. 15 Specifically, let
L = vn- A, where 0:::; A< VI - (n- 1)(8 + a), so that 0 < L:::; vn in all
states of the world, that is, for any k. All other assumptions are as before.
Using the same methods as those in Section 2.2, we find that the loss in value
from liquidation introduces a third source of the equityholders' bargaining
power.
Proposition 7. If the two classes of claimants expect a Chapter 7 sale to
involve a loss of value A, then they will adopt a reorganization plan in round
1, with the equityholders obtaining

VE 1 =

1

2 a( e +
X

n - 1)

max[O,V 1

1

+ 2A +
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L..J

(

1 ) n-1

2

(

n - 1)

k

k=O
-

D

-A - (a + 8)(n - 1) + 28k].

(16)

Proof. See the Appendix.

Let us now examine the change that is introduced by the loss A from
Chapter 7. As the following proposition indicates, the equityholders' share of
V 1 tends to be larger as this loss is larger.
Proposition 8. The share of V 1 obtained by equityholders, VE 1 , is nondecreasing in A. Thus, the equityholders are at least as well off when A > 0 as
they are when A = 0. Furthermore, if the probability that L will exceed D is
less than i, as is likely, then VE 1 is increasing in A. 16
15. Furthermore, to the extent that liquidation does not occur immediately upon rejection of
the last offer in round n, the firm would incur some financial distress costs between the end of
round n and liquidation. In the alternative, then the possibility of L < Vn could represent the
deterioration in the firm's value between the end of round n and liquidation.
16. In particular, if (D - V1) + a(n- 1) +A.:::: fJ, as is likely, then Pr(L >D)<!, and V£ 1 is
increasing in A..
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Remark. The intuition underlying Proposition 8 is as follows. The expectation of the liquidation loss A would strengthen the equityholders' bargaining
power and thereby increase their share, V£ 1 . Without their consent to a
reorganization plan, the firm would not only suffer financial distress costs for
n rounds, but would also suffer the losses from a Chapter 7 sale for less than
the firm's full value. Thus, the equityholders' consent can save the firm the
liquidation loss, A, and therefore they can expect to capture some part of these
savings in exchange for their consent. At the same time, in our model, such a
liquidation loss would reduce the equityholders' "option value," E 1 [VEL]. As
shown in the proof, however, the positive effect is at least as great as the
negative effect on this "option value." Furthermore, under conditions that
ensure Pr(L >D) < -l, which is likely to hold for plausible parameter values,
the positive effect must strictly dominate the negative effect, because then the
loss would be more likely to fall on the debtholders than on the equityholders.
Proof See the Appendix.
2.6 Renegotiation Prior to Chapter 11 Filing

Our model has assumed that the bargaining garpe begins upon the firm's filing
under Chapter 11. One might consider, however, whether the parties would
renegotiate their claims prior to filing under Chapter 11 (see, e.g., Berkovitch
and Israel, Bergman and Callen, and Giammarino). To the extent that some
financial distress costs are incurred prior to the filing, as is likely as the
company approaches insolvency, the parties would have much to gain from
such an earlier renegotiation. By this reasoning, if the parties know that once
there is filing for Chapter 11 the firm's value will be divided in a certain way,
then there will be no such filing because they will agree to such a division
beforehand. Brown, for example, assumes in his model that such renegotiation will always take place.
Various factors, however, suggest that such renegotiation may not succeed
outside of Chapter 11, because there may be a "free rider" or "holdout"
problem (see Gertner and Scharfstein; Gilson, John, and Lang). Consequently, renegotiation would instead take place, as in our model, only after the
filing, and in accordance with the rules governing Chapter 11 reorganization.
Outside of Chapter 11, each debtholders' claim cannot be waived unless the
debtholder individually consents. Thus, each debtholder may hold out, preferring that other debtholders make the necessary concessions. In contrast, under
Chapter 11 a provision for majority rule solves this collective-action problem:
the specified majority in any given class can vote to make concessions on
behalf of each of the members of the class, without the unanimous consent of
its members, and can thereby impose the plan on its members who dissent. 17
17. Similarly, contractual mechanisms could solve this collective-action problem outside of
Chapter 11. The Trust Indenture Act, however, prohibits contractual provisions that would enable
the majority of bondholders to concede any part of the principal on the bonds. As Roe notes, the
unanimous approval requirements of that law may generate holdout problems within a class and
thereby inhibit a troubled firm's ability to avert bankruptcy proceedings.

270

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, V8 N2

Thus, although the parties may renegotiate their claims before filing for
Chapter 11 to avoid excessive delay within Chapter 11, they will face the
problem of holdouts. To solve this problem, the company may file for Chapter
11 so that a majority vote on the proposed plan would bind all members within
each class. Through this mechanism, the negotiating parties can settle on a
reorganization plan before the filing, then have the prepackaged plan confirmed within Chapter 11. See Broude (1990:§ 11.06). Nevertheless, as the
parties formulate the prepackaged plan, they would anticipate the outcome of
Chapter 11 bargaining. Thus, under such prepackaged plans, the equityholders would not receive less than they would expect from Chapter 11
bargaining.
2.7 Chapter 11 Filing by "Solvent" Companies

Thus far we have assumed that upon filing for reorganization, the value of the
firm's assets is less than its debt: V <D. A company, however, need not be
insolvent to file under Chapter 11, and observers generally believe that some
firms file with V 2::: D. We now sketch briefly what our model suggests with
respect to the outcome of such a filing (and the ex ante incentive on the part of
equityholders to have such a filing).
Suppose that a firm files for Chapter 11 with V 2::: D, but with V still small
enough to cause financial distress costs. Our model can be easily extended to
analyze the bargaining game following such a filing. As before, the parties
would understand that delay in adopting a reorganization plan would have two
consequences: the firm would incur financial distress costs, and uncertainty
would be resolved. Therefore, the outcome of the game would still be the
partition described in Proposition 1. The interesting question, however, is
whether this expected outcome of the bargaining game would lead equityholders to favor a filing for Chapter 11.
The partition predicted by Proposition 1 for V 2::: D suggests two possibilities. If Vis sufficiently close to D, the equityholders can still get more
than their contractual right, V - D. Uncertainty would work in favor of the
equityholders through the "option value" element. Moreover, if V is sufficiently close to D (or if the financial distress costs a are large enough), then
the erosion in value that would result from a delay in reorganization for a
period T would come mostly at the expense of the debtholders. Consequently,
the debtholders would make concessions-agree to be paid less than their
contractual right -and the equityholders would thus obtain more than their
contractual right. Given this expected outcome, it would be in the equityholders' interest in such a case for the company's management to file for
Chapter 11.
If V is not sufficiently close to D, however, and the company files for
Chapter 11 , then the outcome of the bargaining game would be unfavorable
for the equityholders. For in such a case, the prospect of financial distress
costs would work against the equityholders in the bargaining, because the
equityholders would be expected to bear most of these costs. Consequently,
the outcome predicted by Proposition 1 might be one in which the debtholders
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obtain more (and the equityholders less) than their contractual right. Such
Chapter 11 cases, however, might not actually arise. In such cases, the interest of equityholders would not be served by the company filing for Chapter
11-they would prefer to have the company pay the debt in full, raising the
necessary funds by selling assets or issuing extra equity. Thus, to the extent
that management seeks to advance the interests of the equityholders, one
would not expect the company to file for Chapter 11 in such cases.l 8
2.8 Informal Offers and Agenda Control

One feature of Chapter 11 that we sought to represent in our model is the fact
that during a certain period only the company could propose reorganization
plans. We assumed that the equityholders would make all offers during this
period, because we assumed that the company's management acts in the
interests of the equityholders. We assumed that thereafter either one class or
the other would have control of the bargaining agenda during each bargaining
round, and that the procedural rules governing formal proposals determined
the duration of these rounds.
One might argue, however, that the model should not feature such exclusive agenda control, in light of the possibility of informal offers. For
example, although the debtholders cannot formally propose plans in the initial
period during which the company has an exclusive right to do so, they can tell
the company informally what plans they would be willing to accept. Therefore, in spite of the exclusive control of the formal agenda under Chapter 11,
one might model the bargaining as a symmetric game in which both sides may
make offers. According to this view, the legal monopoly over the formal
agenda is practically meaningless.
Such a change in assumptions would require only minor modifications in
our model, because exclusive agenda control is not a critical element of the
model. If both classes may make offers throughout the bargaining period, then
each would simply obtain half of the savings created by avoiding the financial
distress costs during this period. Nevertheless, because the provision for
exclusive agenda control during the initial period often arises in policy discussions, we should explain why in our view, in spite of the possibility of
informal offers, control over the formal agenda is important in practice and
may give a significant bargaining advantage to the party with this control.
When one class proposes a formal plan under Chapter 11 , the other class
must decide whether to accept, after the delay required by law. Each knows
that rejection would result in the extra delay required for another proposal and
another vote. The class that proposes the plan can capture almost all the
surplus created by avoiding the delay, because the other class would rather
accept any small share of the surplus than reject the plan and lose the surplus.
Of course, informal offers may precede a formal proposal, but unlike a
formal plan, an informal offer cannot be accepted by a binding class vote. The

18. Managers may file for Chapter 11 in such a case, however, for some self-serving reasons.
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"acceptance" of an informal offer thus lacks the legal implications of the acceptance of a formal offer: an informal acceptance cannot partition the company's value nor bring the company out of Chapter 11. An informal proposal
is merely a suggestion for the other side to make a particular formal proposal.
Regardless of such suggestions, the party making the formal proposal can be
expected to propose the plan most favorable to the proposing party among
those that the other party would rationally accept. 19 Informal proposals cannot
affect this plan if (as is the case in our setting) there is no mechanism by which
the party making an informal proposal can make a credible commitment to
reject any less favorable proposal. 20 Moreover, as long as the debtholders
have no private information (as is the case in our setting), an informal offer by
them cannot convey any information.
In sum, the possibility of informal offers does not render control over the
formal agenda meaningless. This formal control may well give an important
bargaining advantage to the party exercising this control. 21 Therefore, we
have sought to capture this effect in our model.
2.9 Delay in Reaching Agreement on a Plan

In the model, because it was assumed that there was no asymmetric information, the resolution of the bargaining occurred in round 1. Suppose one were
to introduce asymmetric information about the firm's value V. For example,
suppose that the equityholders (or more precisely, the management of the
debtor who might be acting in their interests) have some private information
not held by the debtholders. In this case, the sequential bargaining literature suggests that reaching an agreement may well take some time (as indeed
often happens in reality 22 ) and that the parties will incur significant efficiency
costs. See, for example, Grossman and Perry, Fudenberg and Tirole, and
Crampton. 23
19. Consider a company in which the value of the assets is $100. Suppose that in one month
the court will convert the Chapter 11 proceeding to Chapter 7, and that $30 would be lost in
liquidation, leaving only $70 for the debtholders. Suppose also that one month must pass between
the formal proposal by the equityholders and a vote on that proposal. The equityholders would
propose a plan that would give them almost $30 and leave slightly more than $70 for the
debtholders. Even if the debtholders had suggested informally a plan that would give them more,
say $75, the equityholders would have no reason to modify their plan, because they know that at
the end of the month the debtholders would rationally vote to accept any amount greater than $70.
20. Informal offers would serve a purpose, however, if the debtholders can commit not to give
up more than a certain fraction of the surplus. For example, a bank may be a repeat player in
Chapter 11 reorganizations and may have a reputation that enables it to make such a credible
commitment. In such a case, the bank can insist on a particular fraction of the surplus and
communicate informally its position. To succeed, however, the bank must have not only the
ability to make informal offers but also the ability to make such a commitment.
21. Even prepackaged plans formulated before filing for Chapter 11 would reflect the bargaining advantage that the equityholders would enjoy through their exclusive control over the agenda
during the initial period under Chapter 11. See Section 2.6.
22. White (1984:35, 37) found the average length of the reorganization period, from bankruptcy filing to confirmation of a plan, to be 17 months. See also Franks and Torous (1989:753).
23. Since writing this article, we learned of the work of Kaiser in the direction outlined above.
He introduces asymmetric information in a bargaining model of reorganization and confirms that
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The structure imposed upon the bargaining by Chapter 11 is crucial to this
result. Gul and Sonnenschein point out that asymmetric information between
bargaining parties cannot by itself explain delay in reaching agreement, because as the length of each round is allowed to go to 0, so does the total delay.
This objection does not apply to the reorganization context, however, because
the legal rules governing Chapter 11 bargaining imply that, unlike the case in
other contexts, there is a limit to how short the bargaining rounds can be.

3. Concluding Remarks .
In this article, we have sought to develop a sequential bargaining model of the
Chapter 11 negotiation process, to show the effects of the legal rules that
govern this process, and to determine the shares of the firm's value that
equityholders and debtholders may expect to receive under a reorganization
plan. The model has identified and analyzed three possible sources of the
equityholders' power to obtain value under Chapter 11 even if the value of the
firm's assets is less than its debt: if they were to delay or prevent agreement,
(i) the firm would incur financial distress costs, (ii) the volatility of its assets'
value may create some probability that the firm becomes solvent, and (iii) a
Chapter 7 sale may entail a loss in value.
Our analysis has identified how various features of the company shape the
Chapter 11 division of value. Our results regarding the effects of the company's features provide testable implications of the model. In particular, one
could test the hypotheses that equityholders tend to capture a larger fraction of
the value of the reorganized company when (i) the value of the company's
assets is volatile (as measured, say, by the past volatility of the company's
total stock and bond value), (ii) the nature of the company's business is such
that financial distress costs are likely to be relatively high, or (iii) the total
value of the reorganized company is a relatively large fraction of the outstanding debt. 24
We have also analyzed how the various features of the legal regime contribute to the equityholders' ability to extract value, and our analysis reveals how
changes in this regime would affect the equityholders' share. The length of the
reorganization period-the time that the parties expect the court to allow them
significant delay can result. Kaiser focuses on the possibility of delay and the factors that
determine the length of this delay, not on the factors that determine the division of value between
equityholders and debtholders. Thus, his article complements this article.
24. Recent empirical studies of Chapter II have confirmed that equityholders obtain more than
their contractual right, but have not tested any of these three hypotheses. Our preliminary analysis
of the data presented in Table II of Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990:1463) offers some
support for hypothesis (iii). A simple linear regression on their 30 observations reveals that the
extent to which senior claims (those of creditors and of preferred shareholders) exceed total value
(expressed as a percent of total value) has a statistically significant negative effect upon the
percent of total value paid to common shareholders: we find the relevant coefficient to be
-0.04727, with a standard error of 0.02428. If we restrict the sample to the 18 cases of insolvent
companies, the regression again reveals a negative effect, but it is no longer statistically significant: we find the coefficient to be -0.00729, with a standard error of 0.01267. A proper
hypothesis test, however, would require data on all explanatory variables that the model indicates
we should include in the regression.
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to remain in Chapter 11, without adopting a plan, before converting to Chapter 7-proves to be a critical feature. We find that any change in judicial
attitudes that would shorten this period would decrease the equityholders'
share. In addition, the equityholders benefit from their control over the agenda
during the initial period; thus, any reduction in the length of this period would
tend to shift the division of value in favor of the debtholders. 25
The normative question remains: Is the ability of the equityholders to
receive more than their contractual right in Chapter 11 undesirable? One
perspective from which this question may be evaluated is distributional; that
is, it may be asked whether creditors are treated unfairly. With respect to most
voluntary creditors, the answer may well be no, because the terms of their
contracts will likely take the possibility of Chapter 11 into account. In particular, lenders will likely anticipate the outcome of possible Chapter 11 proceedings and charge a higher interest rate than they would in the absence of
Chapter 11. But companies often have also involuntary creditors, such as tort
victims, who cannot protect themselves contractually as voluntary creditors
can. Chapter 11 does transfer wealth from involuntary creditors to equityholders.
Another perspective from which the distributional consequences of Chapter
11 may be evaluated is that of efficiency. The expectation that equityholders
will be able to use Chapter 11 to obtain more than their contractual right may
affect the investment and management decisions that managers and equityholders make ex ante, either in the financial distress period preceding the
filing for Chapter 11 (see Gertner and Scharfstein) or even prior to the onset of
financial distress (see Bebchuk, 1991). Consequently, the division of value in
Chapter 11, on which the analysis of this article has focused, may well have
significant ex ante efficiency effects.
Appendix
In this appendix we derive several propositions, including our comparative
statics results. To analyze the effect of the parameters on VE 1 , it will prove
useful to make some preliminary observations. Consider the general model in
Section 2.5, in which A~ 0 and L :s Vn. (To apply the following reasoning to
the model in Section 2.4, which addresses a special case of the more general
model, let A = 0, L = Vn, and VEL = VEn-)
First, we derive a lemma pertaining to the "option value" component of
VE 1 • Note that VEL is a continuous function of L - D. In particular, as the
parameters change, VEL will equal (and therefore increase and decrease onefor-one with) L - D if L > D, will remain constant at 0 if L < D, and will

25. Only a more radical reform of Chapter 11, however, can ensure that all participants receive
their contractual rights. Under any regime in which the consent of the equityholders is necessary
to avoid delay in the firm's reorganization, the equityholders will be able to extract some value
above their contractual right. Thus, Bebchuk (1988) proposes a method of reorganization based
not on bargaining but on the distribution of particular securities to the participants. This reform
would produce a distribution of value fully consistent with all the participants' contractual rights.
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increase one-for-one (but not decrease) with L - D if L =D. Therefore, we
can state the following lemma.
Lemma AI. For any parameter x that does not affect the probability distribution of the random variable k-that is, forD - V1 , e, and a-the following
holds for increases in x: 26
aEdVEd

ax

= E [ aVEL
1

·ax

J

~ D)max [ 0, a(L a~ D) IJ.~D ]
+ Pr (L > D )E a(L a~ D) IL > D J.

Pr(L

I [

(A1)
Second, we will find it useful to place an upper limit on Pr(L >D). Given
the symmetric probability distribution of k, if n is odd, then the median value
fork is E 1 [k] = !(n - 1). In that case, the median value for L is similarly
EdL] = VI - a(n - 1) - A, which must be less than D. Therefore, if n is
odd, then Pr(L > D) < !.
If n is instead even, then there is no unique median value fork. In this case,
Pr(L >D) <!if and only if L :=; D fork= !n. As one can see from (12), if k
= !n, then Vn = V 1 - a(n - 1) + e. Therefore, if (D - V 1) + a(n - 1) +
A~
then Pr(L >D)<!. Furthermore, Pr(L >D)>! would require that L
> D fork = !(n - 2). As one can see from (12), however, if k = !(n - 2),
then vn = VI - a(n - 1) - e, which must be less than D. Therefore,
Pr(L > D) > ! is impossible. We summarize these results in the following
lemma.

e,

Lemma A2. Pr(L > D) :=; !, and Pr(L > D) < ! if and only if either
(D - VI) + a(n - 1) + A ~ or n is odd.

e

Using Lemmas A1 and A2, we can now provide proofs of the propositions
stating our comparative statics results.
Proof of Proposition 2. Note that the derivative of Vn - D with respect to
D - V 1 is -1 in any state of the world, that is, for any k. Therefore, recalling
that VEL = VEn and L = Vn, and using Lemma A1,
aEI[VEd
a(D- VI)

- Pr(Vn >D).

(A2)

26. The notation for the partial derivative of VEL (or its expected value) in this lemma and in
the proofs below will represent the limit of .JVEL/.Jx as we approach x from the right side, in
order to describe the effects of an increase in x. To describe decreases in x, we would approach x
from the left side and would replace "max" in (AI) with "min." These two limits are not equal
[i.e., although VEL(x) is continuous, it is not differentiable] at values of x where Pr(L > D)
changes, because this probability changes only in discrete amounts.
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Thus, increases in D - V1 will decrease the equityholders' "option value"
until D - V1 ~ (n- 1)(8- a). At that point, by (15), the probability of Vn >
D (and the "option value") reaches 0, and by (A2), increases in D - V 1 then
will have no further effect.
•
Proof of Proposition 3. First, note that the partial derivative of Vn in (12)
with respect to is 2k - (n - 1), which is greater or less than 0 as k is greater
or less than !(n - 1). That is, Vn increases in 8 in those states of the world in
which k is larger than E 1 [k] = !(n - 1), which by (12) are those states in
which Vn is larger than E 1 [Vn] = V1 - a(n - 1). Because Vn can affect
E 1 [VEn] only in those states in which Vn exceeds or equals D, which in tum
exceeds V 1 - a(n - 1) (indeed, exceeds V 1 ), 8 can affect E 1 [VEn] only in
those states in which Vn is increasing in 8. In the relevant states, therefore,
2k - (n - 1) > 0, and a rise in 8 can only increase Vn - D in the expression for the equityholders' "option value" in (13). Recalling that VEL = VEn
and L = V n• and using Lemma A 1, then

e

(A3)
Furthermore, by reasoning analogous to that used to derive (15), the following
two conditions are equivalent:

Pr(Vn

~

D)

>

0

~ (n -

1)(8 - a)

~

D - V1•

(A4)

A rise in 8, by (A3) and (A4), will have no effect on the expected value of VEn
until 8 ~ a + (D - V 1)/(n - 1); further increases will raise equityholders'
"option value."

•

Proof of Proposition 4. First, note that the equityholders' "option value" is
nonincreasing in a. A rise in a shifts the entire probability distribution of Vn
downward and so reduces Vn - D in the expression for the equityholders'
"option value" in (13). In all states of the world, that is, for any k, the
derivative of vn- D with respect to a will be -(n- 1). Recalling that VEL=
VEn and L = Vn, and using Lemma A1, then
(A5)
Thus, a will have no effect if Pr(Vn > D) = 0 already. That is, by (15), an
increase in a will reduce the "option value" until a ~ 8 + (V1 - D)l(n - 1).
Then the "option value" will be 0, and further increases in a will have no
effect on it.
It will be useful to place an upper limit on the absolute value of the negative
effect of a on the "option value." By Lemma A2, Pr(Vn >D) can be at most
!. Therefore, (A5) implies that the derivative of E 1 [VEn] with respect to a can
range from 0 to -!(n - 1).
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e or of

D - VI, will also depend on an effect on the "efficiency gains" component,
that is, the first term in (13). An increase in a has an unambiguously posi-

tive effect on this component of the equityholders' share: the derivative of
ia(e + n - 1) with respect to a is i(e + n - 1). This effect will always be
greater than the absolute value of the negative effect on the "option value"
component in (13), because e > 0.
•
Proof of Proposition 5. By (15), the "option value" component of the
equityholders' share will remain at 0 until n > 1 + (D - VI)/(8- a). Once n
rises above this level, their expected round-n payoff rises above 0. Thus, at
that point the "option value" increases in n.
The "option value," however, will not be monotonically nondecreasing in
n. Instead, it may decrease in particular cases. Note that EI[Vn] = VI a(n - 1), so that each unit increase inn causes the expected value of Vn to fall
by a. Indeed, an increase from n = N ton = N + 1 will reduce the expected
value of Vn, conditional on any particular VN, by the amount VN- EN[VN+ I]
= a. Therefore, it is easy to construct cases in which the expected value of
Vn, conditional on Vn > D, will fall with an increase from n = N ton = N +
1. The equityholders' expected round n payoff will then fall, provided that
Pr(Vn > D) does not rise.
It will prove useful to place a ceiling on the absolute value of the negative
effect that n may have on the equityholders' "option value." A unit rise inn
cannot cause the expected value of Vn, conditional on Vn > D, to fall by more
than a. Thus, a rise in n from N toN + 1 can reduce EdVEn] by at most
a Pr(VN >D), because it can only reduce VEnin those states of the world in
which Vn >D. Recall also that Lemma A2, with A = 0 and L = Vn, implies
that Pr(Vn > D) can never exceed l and can equal l only if n is even.
Therefore, if Pr(Vn >D) equals l, then a rise inn from N toN+ 1 results in
an odd n, so the median VN +I is strictly less than D, and E I [VEn] must fall by
strictly less than a Pr(Vn > D). Thus, a unit rise in n will cause the equityholders' "option value" to fall by an absolute value strictly less than la.
To consider the effect of n upon the "efficiency gains" component, note that
the derivative of ia(e + n - 1) with respect to n is la, which is unambiguously positive. This positive effect upon the "efficiency gains" component of the equityholders' share must be greater than the absolute value of the
negative effect upon the "option value" component. Thus, each unit increase
in n must cause V£ 1 to increase.
•
Proof of Proposition 7. By the same reasoning used in Section 2.2backward induction from round n to round 1-the equityholders would obtain
(4), that is, V£ 1 = ia(e + n - 1) + EI[VEn]. If L < Vn, however, then VEn
will not equal VEL. Consider the reasoning used to derive (3) with respect to
the financial distress costs, but substitute A for a, round n for round i, and
liquidation for round i + 1. One can show that the party making the offer in
round n would hold its opponent to its payoff from liquidation and thereby
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obtain the surplus from avoiding liquidation, .A, plus its own payoff from
liquidation. In liquidation, the equityholders would receive VEL =
max(O, Vn - .A - D), and the debtholders would receive the complementary
share VDL = L - VEL = vn - A - max(O, vn - A - D) = min(Vn - A,D).
Each party would make the offer in round n (and thus capture the surplus .A)
with probability!. In this case, E 1 [VEn] =!.A+ E 1 [VEL], and substituting this
expression in (4) yields
(A6)
Consider the reasoning used to prove Lemma 1, but applied to L rather than to
Vn. An analogous lemma implies that (A6) equals (16).
•
Proof of Proposition 8. The loss from liquidation, .A, affects VE 1 through
both the second and third terms in (16). Note that the derivative of L - D with
respect to .A is -1 in any state of the world, that is, for any k. Therefore, using
Lemma AI,
- Pr(L >D).

(A7)

By (A7), the derivative of the third term, E 1 [max(O, L- D)], with respect to
.A, is - Pr(L > D). The derivative of the second term with respect to .A,
however, equals ! . The positive effect on the second term would be greater
than or equal to the absolute value of the negative effect on the third term,
because by Lemma A2, Pr(L >D) ::s !. Therefore, VE 1 is nondecreasing in .A.
Moreover, if Pr(L >D)<!, then VE 1 is increasing in .A. Lemma A2-which
states that if (D - VI) + a(n - 1) +A 2:: e, then Pr(L >D)< !-completes
the proof.
•
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